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What are the experiences of donors using macroeconomic tools to intervene in countries to 
support the commercial import of food staples such as wheat and rice?  What has been done 
and what lessons have been learned?  [This excludes humanitarian food aid.]  
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1. Executive summary 
A functional financial sector, including foreign currency market is critical to enable effective 
private sector imports of essentials such as food.  Donor funded technical assistance can support 
this, and is more likely to be effective where political will and security conditions are moving in a 
positive direction. 
Where there is an operational parallel market, imports can get constrained by lack of access to 
foreign exchange.  In cases where trading through the official rate is no longer credible for 
donors, donor flows can help deepen parallel market operations which can benefit domestic 
traders requiring foreign exchange for imports.   
Monetised food aid can provide some relief to severe shortages in domestic markets, 
providing care is taken to not distort local markets or consumption preferences.  The domestic 
funds raised through this process will require a use.  It is an aid modality primarily used by the 
USA. 
2 
Concessional credit lines from bilateral sources exist where there is the political interest 
to underwrite the risk.  However OECD bilateral donors are generally risk adverse in terms of 
export credit to fragile states. Most aid-related funding to support balance of payments, which in 
turn help support food imports in low income countries, is channelled through subsidised 
International Financial Institution (IFI) credit lines. 
There are some cases where bilateral donors have worked to facilitate financial flows in 
crisis affected states to directly or indirectly support imports; in Somalia’s case there was 
considerable effort to avoid hawala
1
 remittance flows being constrained, which are critical for 
financing food imports into Somalia.  In Zimbabwe, a donor fund that guarantees foreign 
exchange payment of maize imports against domestic payments has recently been set up to help 
ease an acute need for staple food imports. 
Significant donor foreign-exchange inflows help ease foreign exchange constraints.  
These donor inflows can also directly benefit households through cash or agro-inputs for 
increased domestic food production. While investments such as agro-inputs are costly at scale, it 
is cost effective compared to anticipated food aid requirements in protracted crisis situations.  In 
some cases, voucher schemes can be designed to act as a de facto guarantee of payment 
of foreign exchange required by importers.   
2. Introduction 
A macro-economic impact on essential food imports generally occur when there is a balance of 
payment (BoP) crisis, or other capacity constraints to imports as a result of conflict or political 
decisions.  Macro-economic or other shocks such as climatic or conflict related can also be 
expected to significantly affect households’ ability to produce and/or procure basic foods, and 
which can further deepen the crisis.   
This note seeks to explore cases where donors have been able to have a macro-level impact on 
the causes and consequences of challenges to essential food imports.  What this note does not 
explore are formal IMF-led interventions which are designed to overcome the balance of 
payment challenges which impact on capacity to import essential food, as well as humanitarian 
food responses.  While it seeks to summarise lessons generally, it is written taking into 
consideration the challenges faced in Yemen in March 2017.  It is also written to accompany the 
associated note Responding to Central Bank collapse. 
3. Donor agency macroeconomic support for food imports 
Helping ensure a functional financial system 
Having an operational central bank to help enable an effective financial sector, as well as ensure 
sufficient availability of foreign exchange for imports, is an important part of facilitating essential 
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trade such as food imports.
2
  This especially affects conflict states, and most donor interventions 
reflect post-conflict support.  In most cases would have led to a fuller IMF-led programme of 
support. 
In Rwanda, the tragic 1994 genocide led to major challenges at the central bank including in 
human resource capacity.  International support led to a streamlined role to reflect capacity 
constraints and enable greater focus (IMF 2007).  This included a more flexible monetary and 
exchange rate policy, and a separate internal audit unit to ensure credibility.  In Somalia, donor 
support led by the World Bank, IMF and AfDB has helped to re-establish its central bank and 
gradually increase its role including supervision of a new formal banking system which had 
closed due to the conflict (World Bank 2015). 
In the Democratic Republic of Congo, the initial focus post 1998-2001 conflict was to focus on 
core central bank roles.  This included the establishment of an effective Foreign Exchange 
Department to enable foreign exchange operations which were critical to support trade; here 
support was also brought in from other central banks eg: the National Bank of Belguim (IMF 
2006).  The shift to a free floating rate was already identified as a key step to ease the 
constraints on access to foreign exchange which previously had led to reduced ability to import 
food as well as fuel required for food distribution in-country (FAO 2000).  
In Liberia, a more interventionist approach was taken by the group of key international partners 
(UN, World Bank, IMF, EU, Ghana, Nigeria, USA, ECOWAS, AU). This included the placement 
of international experts, which in some cases had co-signature authority. This was to help ensure 
credibility of what were still very weak institutions; however it was also politically challenging 
given the perception of an affront to the sovereignty of a country. The role of regional powers and 
the UN were important in brokering this arrangement (Dwan 2006). 
Evaluations of technical assistance provide variable pictures, which are often context specific. 
The IEO 2014 review notes IMF technical assistance
3
 has improved in terms of better reflecting a 
balance between authority’s needs and IMF priorities,  albeit limited by the fact that demand for 
IMF provided technical assistance (TA) significantly outstrips supply. Reviews of regional IMF 
Technical Assistance Centres suggest technical assistance is generally effective, with the 
proviso of attribution being a challenge (Consulting Base 2013, ECORYS 2014). However 
technical assistance tended to be more effective in countries that were relatively stable/post-
conflict (ECORYS 2014). 
Where the official rate is no longer a credible option for donors, a shift to the parallel market can 
be a constructive move. Reasons can include value-for-money, or concerns over the poor use of 
the foreign exchange received by the government (effectively at an overvalued rate).  
In the case of Zimbabwe in the mid-2000s, the official rate was significantly overvalued, and 
domestic prices shifted to be set by the parallel market making operating through the official rate 
very poor value for money. While illegal in-country, parallel market operations were legal outside 
Zimbabwe, with London and Johannesburg being two main bases for transactions – in part 
reflecting the large remittances from the UK and South Africa.  All the major donors, and donor 
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 The associated note “Responding to central bank collapse” looks at this question in greater detail. 
3
 There are limited cases of non-IMF managed technical assistance to central banks; with the exception of other 
central bank support.  However evidence of impact of this type of intervention is limited. 
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funded agencies, were able to shift to off-shore operations deepening the market, and helped 
deepen the parallel foreign exchange market, which in turn provided a reference point for the 
more informal sector as well as eased access to foreign exchange for importers of essential food 
and fuel.   
Similarly donor support has been in place to support remittance flows such as Somalia, for 
example the UK supported Somali-U.K. Safer Corridor Pilot to be mobilized in the event of a 
significant disruption in remittances (World Bank 2015). 
Monetising food imports 
Examples of food monetising are almost exclusively based on USA food aid, where this 
approach enables greater exports of USA grains and oils, and the domestic currency is then 
used to fund domestic spend of NGOs and in some cases, government (Schnepf 2016).  
For example, Somalia has a relatively high dependence on imported staple foods (wheat and 
rice) to complement domestic production (maize and sorghum).  In the 1980s, the Government of 
Somalia with support from donors would monetise food aid.  This ensured a steady supply as 
well as a source of revenue for the government, contributing up to 10% of the Governments 
budget (Hossein Farzin, 1988). 
Monetisation has its critics, including inefficiencies (cash transfers are generally cheaper) and 
market distortions (US food aid needs to have an approved Bellmon estimation
4
 to avoid market 
distortions).  However it does enable significant imports of essential foods that can then be sold 
at market rate and in some cases help support market structures, as well as then fund further 
spend in-country (Schnepf 2016).  
For example in the 2011 famine hitting southern Somalia, Food for Peace working with IOM 
monetised sorghum to help supply the market and stabilise prices (Humanitarian Outcomes 
2013). US funding similarly sold sorghum during shortfalls of food in Zimbabwe in the mid 2000s.  
In both cases, this has provided a familiar staple food option if often considered an “inferior good” 
to eg: wheat and maize.  There is a significant time lag for this kind of programme, which makes 
it more suitable for a protracted crisis. 
Foreign exchange credit lines to support importers 
Extreme balance of payment crisis in low income countries can benefit from additional, more 
concessional, support from the IMF.  In Liberia, following the Ebola crisis, balance of payment 
support was provided to enable inter alia, core imports including staple foods.  This was through 
the IMF Catastrophic Containment and Relief Trust (CCR) to temporarily service Liberia’s debts.  
In addition, and a Rapid Credit Facility (RCF) was agreed to cover the financing gap and provide 
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 The Bellmon Estimation is required before food aid can be shipped, and which must determine that adequate 
storage is available and that incoming food aid will not result in substantial disincentives for domestic production 
or marketing. 
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liquidity to the banking system (IMF, 2015).  The CCR window however is limited to low income 
countries facing natural disasters or wide-spread health crisis.
5
 
Bilateral finance tends to be through export credit agencies and banks, and while the 
underwriting of risk can reduce the financing terms, these would not generally count as aid.  
More specific (and subsidised) credit lines for essential imports are generally linked to wider 
political objectives. For example, there are reports of credit lines and grants to support food 
imports provided to Syria from Iran, and from Qatar to the opposition held areas of Syria.
6
  
Venezuela implemented a scheme of subsidised fuel exports backed by credit lines to the 
Caribbean region and key partner countries who were members of the ALBA group
7
 (Economist 
2014).  Some traditional
8
  bilateral donor countries do still provide concessional trade finance, 
however this type of finance is risk adverse in terms of covering fragile states. Support for 
broader balance of payments would generally be expected to be managed through donor-funded 
concessional funding via the IMF and other IFIs. 
DFID has recently set up a facility for importers access to foreign exchange to pay suppliers in 
the context of a poor domestic harvest requiring significant staple food maize imports. The limited 
reserves and liquidity in Zimbabwe have meant importers face challenges using domestic 
payments to make international payments. Capped at USD20.9 million, the recently operational 
scheme which runs until 31 March 2017 is operated by the implementing agent competitively 
selecting importers of maize, who then make payments into a local account. The implementing 
agent then settles the international payment for the importer for the equivalent of the amount 
deposited. DFID then draws down the domestically held funds for its local payments.  Suppliers 
are expected to target sales in districts receiving cash transfers (DFID 2016).  
Direct support to populations through cash transfers or vouchers 
In general terms, the donor community has shifted significantly towards cash transfers to replace 
food aid; however this has depended on the context and specific donor. Costs are generally 
significantly lower, and cash is consistently found to be more efficient that in-kind provision.  
When compared to vouchers, outcomes are more mixed, as it arguably depends on what the 
objective is.  Cash will generally be most effective at increasing household welfare; however food 
voucher may be more effective at specifically improving food security and can also hedge against 
local inflation if the voucher is to cover a quantity rather than a value (Venton 2015).  





  http://www.syria-report.com/trending-content/Wheat?page=2 
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 Using “traditional” as OECD DAC country members, though other non-OECD countries also have a history of 
providing bilateral aid. 
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The government of Pakistan with donor support, has delivered two of the largest cash transfers 
programmes in global terms. The humanitarian “WATAN card”9 reached around 1.6 million 
families through cash payments, designed to help families hit by the 2010 floods and delivered 
jointly by the Government of Pakistan and range of donors.  The foreign exchange inflow from 
the donor element worth USD500 million helped Pakistan’s macro-economy manage the shock 
from the floods, as well as aided a more rapid recovery (in eg: higher subsequent harvest and 
lower than expected default rate to micro-financial sector) (OPM 2013). The BISP
10
 is a longer 
term social cash transfer programme, set up initially to protect the poorest against the rise in 
commodity prices in 2008. As part of more recent international support to Pakistan when at risk 
of a balance of payment crisis, donor funds were increased to bolster BISP to reach more 
beneficiaries as well as increase the payment amount to each recipient. DFID additionally 
provided budget support to ease the fiscal impacts as well as BoP, with part of the funds directly 
earmarked to cash transfers and conditional on targets met (the other key disbursement-related 
targets were tax-related) (DFID 2014). 
Despite very limited preparation time and ongoing conflict, large scale cash and food vouchers 
were effectively distributed in the 2011 famine in southern Somalia. This serves as an example of 
where cash and food vouchers can have a role despite a priori concerns of donors and 
implementing partners (Humanitarian Outcomes 2013).   
Direct support to domestic producers through fertilizer and seeds (in-kind and vouchers) 
Evaluations at the household level of large scale agro-inputs suggest that results are context 
specific. The provision of fertilizer (and sometimes also seeds) will have an output impact which 
increases food security of the household and community. Its impact on medium term recovery is 
more variable; chronically poor are unlikely to jump out of poverty. It is also an expensive option 
if done at scale, however very cost effective when food aid requirements are anticipated to be 
very significant in a following year. A computable general equilibrium analysis which also 
captures the indirect benefits of the national agro-input scheme in Malawi (government and 
donor funded) suggests a strong case for the programme in terms of macro-economic impact 
(Arndt 2016).  
Commodity-based
11
 vouchers can provide assurances for importers as this provides a guarantee 
of foreign exchange payment where donor funded. Given the protracted crisis in Zimbabwe, 
donor funding enabled early purchase of imported fertilizer (leading to competitive prices), with 
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 Meaning “country” in Urdu, the WATAN card was a pre-loaded debit card working on the visa network.  Each 
beneficiary was biometrically verified, and their card was then credited in two instalments to access as with any 
visa debit card. 
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 The Benazir Income Support Programme provides a regular unconditional payment primarily through a debit 
card to around 5 million women and their families who were below the poverty line, with an additional conditional 
cash transfer linked to child attendance at school. 
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 Commodity based vouchers provide X amount of a specific commodity such as a bag of fertilizer. They protect 
the beneficiary against price fluctuations, but are not flexible in terms of their use and less effective in terms of 
crowding in the market at the local level. Value-based vouchers have  a cash equivalent,  which can be relatively 
“closed” and so eligible for use for a specific or range of specific agro-inputs, or more “open” so can be redeemed 
for any product sold by the accredited outlet (usually an agro-input store).  Open vouchers are generally preferred 
for their flexibility/reduced likelihood of beneficiaries selling them at a discount for cash.  However they do also 
mean it is harder to pre-determine the end use and therefore pre-plan suppliers to meet the demand. 
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the suppliers knowing “demand” is guaranteed and payment against re-deemed vouchers would 
be in foreign exchange (so potentially a “bankable” for credit purposes). In some cases, there 
was a co-payment, which covered domestic costs (as well as reduced perception of a “hand-out”) 
with donor funds covering the actual fertiliser input costs. 
4. Commentary and conclusion 
These are reflection by the author, which may or may not apply to the actual realities faced by 
Yemen. 
Periods of major political crisis, especially with associated conflict, will tend to have protracted 
negative impacts on the population and the wider economy.  For donors, getting the balance right 
between responding to often an urgent humanitarian crisis and medium term needs can be 
technically challenging.  However in practise, it is often more difficult in political terms, for both 
donor countries and in-country, given the many risks and unknowns. 
However the impacts on the private sector, including the micro-enterprise and household 
economy will be somewhat easier to anticipate if still challenging to respond to.  Ensuring 
appropriate and effective support is important at both an ethical level in terms of supporting those 
most in need, and also working to maintain capacity for a more rapid economic recovery.  Prices 
are likely to rise against incomes, affecting food security as well as wider purchasing power, and 
productive inputs from fuel to fertilizer will be harder to access as well as afford. 
To help limit this challenges, an important priority is likely to ensure a functioning currency, 
probably also a hard currency operating alongside it which ideally is something accessed by low 
income households to protect their limited assets as well as the better off.  The fiscal impact on 
government can be a real challenge with inflation-related risks associated with a growing fiscal 
deficit
12
, though a non-functional central bank may limit this possibility though impact directly on 
the ability of government to provide basis services.  Similarly a functioning and relatively deep 
exchange rate market is needed that provides flexibility to the economy to respond to shocks.  
This can be a parallel rate or an official rate that mostly mirrors the parallel rate.  Working to 
support key institutions, including the essential functions of a central bank, will be important for 
the recovery period even if “returns to investment” are very limited while political and actual 
conflict remains a reality. 
To help ensure food security through the market, the economically optimal way is likely to be 
through direct cash transfers, and the removal of subsidies including through an overvalued 
official exchange rate (which a non-fiscal tax to exporters/official rate purchases of domestic 
currency)
13
.  The savings from generalised subsidies and loses from an overvalued currency are 
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 This assumes a loss of revenue, as well as a shift in international credit and donor-funded grants to be off 
budget and primarily focussed on humanitarian challenges.  In protracted crisis cases, donor funded parallel 
support to state functions can be built up, such as donor funded essential drugs and even “top-ups” for staff in the 
health sector (as an example) which reduce the fiscal impact of donor including IFI withdrawal while not 
undermining state functions. 
13
 While a parallel rate can have a risk premium (especially where illegal and fragmented), it will be closer to a 
market rate than an official rate that no longer is set by the market.  Where there is a significant difference with 
the official rate, a subsidy is effectively in place, with exporters/those selling foreign exchange are “subsidizing” 
imports/those purchasing foreign exchange. 
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likely to be more than sufficient to cover the cost of cash transfers, and cash will help underpin 
the secondary market for food aid (which is often sold at a loss for households requiring cash).  It 
is of course recognised that there are short to medium run technical challenges to wide coverage 
of a cash payment, however also examples where this has been possible in very challenging 
environments.   
Similarly facilitating key agriculture inputs (fertiliser, potentially seed) offer a way of reducing 
future food aid requirements as well as boost the household economy and wider economy, 
ideally accompanied by some extension support as well as through a gender sensitive design.  
Facilitating trade financing would then be the priority, and potential currency swaps backed by 
donor needs for domestic currency (as in the DFID example being implemented in Zimbabwe) 
may be an effective short term measure. 
Along with what domestic production is possible, remittances are likely to be the main engine of 
consumption and economic activity.  Helping reduce their transaction costs, including making 
electronic transfers easier, is likely to have a valued impact.  A shift to e-banking may also help 
the market (ie: parallel) rate deepen and so facilitate the foreign exchange transactions required 
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